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*  Economics used to play a limited role in foreign 
policy, which was about wars, conflicts and 
human disasters – and how to avoid them. But 
neither China nor the United States now separates 
economics from geopolitics. The competition 
between them is simultaneously an economic 
competition and a security competition. This is 
a threat to the multilateral system the European 
Union has relied on for nearly seven decades 
and to the EU’s separation of external economic 
relationships from geopolitics. You and your 
Commission colleagues must redefine for the 
EU its concept of economic sovereignty and the 
instruments it needs to defend and promote it.
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1 STATE OF AFFAIRS
Your predecessors rarely spoke to economists, let alone received 
memos from them. High Representatives deal with wars, con-
flicts and human disasters – and how to avoid them. Economists, 
and your colleagues in charge of economic issues within the 
Commission, deal with peacetime concerns: growth, inflation, 
jobs, public finances, trade, competitiveness. Every now and then, 
economic mismanagement results in a country entering your orbit 
(like Venezuela currently). Every now and then, an opposite tran-
sition takes place and economic development must be supported 
after peace or civil concord has been restored. But otherwise there 
has not been much communication between the foreign affairs and 
security sphere and the economic sphere. It is becoming clear, how-
ever, that in the current context increasing interlinkages between 
economics and power politics mean you must play a greater role 
in reinforcing and defending Europe’s economic sovereignty. This 
memo summarises and expands on Leonard et al (2019) a June 2019 
Bruegel and European Council on Foreign Relations paper that dis-
cusses in detail the economic sovereignty issue.  
There were good reasons for the division between the foreign 
policy sphere and the economic sphere. Through the first decades of 
its history and up until very recently, the European Union took it for 
granted that the global system provided a functional framework for 
international economic relations. For sure, the economic rules were 
determined by power relations in the wake of the second world war. 
But in the years that followed, even the United States by and large 
kept to them. It regarded economic integration as conducive to the 
strength of the free world, and it stood by this principle even after the 
Soviet Union ceased to exist and was no longer a security challenge.
The EU has always believed in the primacy of economics. As a 
consequence, sovereignty for the EU as a whole was and remains 
first and foremost economic sovereignty. The collective capacity 
of the EU and its member countries working together to preserve 
their economic independence underpins the bloc’s value to 
Europe’s citizens. That argument is bolstered by the EU’s ability to 
participate in defining the rules of the game for the global econ-
omy – what Chancellor Merkel calls Handlungsfähigkeit and the 
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French call Europe puissance. 
In this context, the EU’s international economic policy was 
reasonably insulated from geopolitical concerns. Its construction – 
with most international economic powers given to EU-level bodies 
and most security and foreign policy instruments left at mem-
ber-state level – reflected this assumption.
But perhaps the EU has been lucky so far. Perhaps the EU’s 
apparent economic independence in the global context was 
always the result of a lack of geopolitical interference. It is becom-
ing ever clearer that neither the US nor China separate economics 
from geopolitics. The competition between them is simultaneously 
an economic competition and a security competition.
Our separation between the economic and the geopoliti-
cal spheres was always fragile. It now looks outdated. National 
security issues are gaining prominence everywhere, as is the 
almost-forgotten relationship between economics and national 
security. Economic connections, from cyberspace to financial 
links, are becoming the primary areas of great-power competition 
and are increasingly at risk of being weaponised. Powerful coun-
tries often no longer abide by the primacy of economics. 
In this new world there are more and more cases in which the 
US and China follow neither the letter nor the spirit of the rules in 
their relationships with the EU and its member states. The US deci-
sion in 2018 to make full use of the centrality of its currency and its 
financial system to enforce secondary sanctions against Iran was a 
major shock to its European partners. The US decisions to aban-
don core principles of the global multilateral trading system and to 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement have been further shocks for 
the EU and the world. 
On China, the EU has been slow to realise that, as your prede-
cessor noted together with the European Commission in their joint 
communication of March 2019, China behaves as “an economic 
competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a sys-
temic rival promoting alternative models of governance” (European 
Commission/High Representative, 2019).
This new linkage across policy areas is deeply destabilising 
because the EU’s own rules and the organisation of its governance 
* CHINA-US 
COMPETITION
* ECONOMIC 
NATIONALISM
 JEAN PISANI-FERRY AND GUNTRAM B. WOLFF5 | 
were designed under the assumption that external economic rela-
tionships would be ringfenced from the interference of geopolitics. 
In this new context, it will be your responsibility and that of your 
Commission colleagues to redefine for the EU its concept of eco-
nomic sovereignty and the instruments it intends to use to defend 
and promote it. 
2 CHALLENGES
European economic sovereignty faces many threats, ranging from 
structural demographic and technological trends to lone-wolf 
hackers in their parents’ basements revealing state secrets. But 
China and the United States represent specific and particularly 
difficult problems.  
China 
China simultaneously pursues economic growth, technolog-
ical development and geopolitical influence. For this reason, 
the acquisition of a European company by a Chinese company 
might be motivated by long-term national or even Chinese 
Communist Party priorities rather than private profit-making 
objectives. Similarly, trade and investment relationships with 
third countries might be motivated by China’s search for influ-
ence and its desire to secure commodity supplies, rather than 
by the intrinsic economic value of any particular project.   
The EU has three main concerns when it comes to China: 
China’s influence over individual EU countries, the blurring 
of economic interests and security/military goals, and China’s 
divergence from multilateral standards.
On the first, Chinese influence over individual EU countries 
is a potential obstacle to effective foreign policymaking in 
the EU. China has already leveraged investment and other 
economic tools to influence EU positions, for example to soften 
opposition to its policies and its domestic human rights record. 
These problems stem mostly from the EU’s unique internal 
organisation, particularly the requirement for unanimity on 
foreign-policy decisions. Other powers including the US and 
Russia have long used bilateral relations to undermine EU 
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foreign-policy unity. 
Second, China has an ambitious strategy to gain economic 
leadership. From a historical standpoint, this is a normal goal for 
a rising nation, but China’s stated ambition to win the global com-
petition over emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence 
and biotech, the breadth of policy instruments at the disposal of the 
government – including through direct or indirect influence over 
companies’ strategic choices – and the very asymmetric character of 
the bilateral investment relationship all pose challenges to the EU. 
Third, China takes liberties with multilateral rules, as demon-
strated by the Belt and Road initiative, which aims to leverage 
Chinese trade flows to build infrastructure and create a broad 
network of partner countries. The BRI is explicitly not a multilateral 
framework for trade, investment and financial relationships. Rather 
it is centred on China. Some worry that China’s financial claims over 
over-indebted countries could be turned into control of strategic 
infrastructure. 
In short, China is a major rising power with increasingly global 
interests that might collide with European interests. The EU has 
awoken to the challenge but it has not yet defined its response. It 
needs to shape a strategy for its foreign policy, its technology and 
investment policy and its policy on China in third markets and mul-
tilateral institutions.
The US
The United States has been Europe’s most important ally since 
the second world war. The ongoing alliance with the United States 
reflects Europe’s democratic values and history. However, the 
presidency of Donald Trump has created serious doubts in the EU 
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about the reliability and implications of that alliance. Moreover, 
the Trump administration has actively reduced the support it gives 
to the multilateral order and has used its unique position within 
the global economic order to extract immediate economic gains or 
secure geopolitical goals. The dollar, the US’s financial system and 
its current role as a hub for the global digital architecture provide 
the US with an unrivalled ability to use the global system to serve 
its own security goals.
On Iran – over which the crisis appears to be deepening at the 
time of writing – a 1996 EU regulation (Regulation (EC) No 2271/96) 
is intended to protect European companies from US enforcement of 
secondary sanctions. The EU attempted to leverage this to negotiate 
an EU exception from US secondary sanctions. But in the context 
of globalisation, the even more central position of the US financial 
system now means that such regulations no longer have the same 
deterrent value. European banks and companies do not believe in the 
EU’s ability to protect them and place too much value on their access 
to the United States to even take the risk. They have pre-emptively 
complied with US sanctions, even as their governments have urged 
them not to. More generally, the economic relationship with Iran has 
not been stopped by technical problems but by often direct political 
pressure. The challenge the EU faces in preserving its economic sover-
eignty is compounded by its security dependence on the US.
Europe’s strategic challenge
Europe’s response to this new situation has been piecemeal. It 
has shown a readiness to address the new challenges in fields 
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including trade, foreign direct investment, finance and currency 
internationalisation. But what it needs is a more encompassing 
strategy for the new context in which partners and competitors are 
prepared to let economic relationships serve broader geostrategic 
goals. Such a strategy should be based on, first, a definition of what 
the EU considers the key tenets of economic sovereignty; second, 
on a clarification of the EU’s goals and strategy for achieving them; 
and third, on a review and reform of the EU toolkit so it has the 
right instruments. 
The starting point should be a confirmation that it is in the EU’s 
interest to remain highly open and intertwined with international 
partners. In the US, there is a growing debate about decoupling 
from China. But a decoupling strategy cannot be in the EU’s inter-
est. First, EU prosperity critically depends on global economic 
exchange. Second, China is set to become an increasingly relevant 
trading partner for the EU and it is therefore in the EU’s interest 
to engage with China. Third, while the US is in direct geopolitical 
confrontation with China, the EU is not. The central challenge for 
the EU is therefore to uphold its economic sovereignty while stay-
ing highly intertwined with both the US and China. 
3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The EU needs a change of mindset to address threats to its eco-
nomic sovereignty. It must learn to think as a geopolitical power, 
define its goals and act strategically. After decades during the 
priority was internal integration – through the single market, 
common regulations, common policies and the creation of a 
common currency – the EU needs to refocus its attention on its 
relationship with the rest of the world. 
Building economic sovereignty does not imply turning one’s 
back on globalisation or refraining from taking an active part in 
global collective action. Global competition and linkages are good 
for growth, innovation and consumer choice. Europe’s aim is not, 
and should not be, to reduce trade or investment links with the 
global economy. It should be to strengthen the rules-based order, 
not to undermine it.
Nor does building economic sovereignty mean containing the 
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spread of technology. Such an attempt would probably be unsuc-
cessful: even at the height of the Cold War, technology diffused 
broadly within a matter of years. In the current much more inter-
connected world, technological leadership depends on continu-
ous investment and innovation and benefits from engagement and 
cooperation. Concretely, the EU is certain to benefit from cut-
ting-edge Chinese technology. The EU’s aim should be common 
and effective rules for intellectual property, investment and 
subsidies. Simultaneously, it should strengthen Europe’s capacity 
to protect core infrastructure where direct security interests are at 
stake and respond effectively to foreign initiatives that undermine 
its economic sovereignty.  
Building economic sovereignty, however, requires the EU 
to stop thinking and acting as a ‘fragmented power’. Currently, 
European economic governance purposefully ignores geopo-
litical considerations. Because of a division of tasks in which 
Brussels deals with international economic concerns such 
as trade, while related geopolitical issues belong largely to EU 
member states, the EU has behaved as a fragmented power (Sapir, 
2007). It has enormous potential power, but its decision-making 
structures are too disjointed to capitalise on that potential. It is 
high time to unlock this potential.
Building European economic sovereignty will involve 
patient negotiation between European partners on a series of 
specific, often technical measures, and a gradual implemen-
tation period. Not all EU countries have the same perception 
of their sovereignty and the threats to it. Some are simply too 
dependent on the US security umbrella to oppose almost any 
US initiative. Some have built strong economic ties with China 
and refrain from criticising it. In the fields of trade policy 
or single market regulations, where policy initiatives are by 
nature common, compromises will need to be found. In others 
such as industrial policy or cyber security, variable-geometry 
approaches can be implemented. 
Details matter. It is easy for economic measures justified on 
geopolitical grounds to be captured by special interests and to 
lapse into protectionism with lasting negative consequences for 
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both economic growth and national security. State aid intended 
to maintain technological competitiveness can easily become 
inefficient jobs programmes. Efforts to broaden the use of the euro 
could easily morph into subsidies for favoured banks. These risks 
imply that such measures need to result from a considered process 
that is capable both of weighing the trade-offs between economic 
efficiency and national security and of maintaining a reasonable 
distance from special interests. 
To both achieve a change in mindset and to give it institutional 
expression, we recommend a four part strategy for the EU: 
1. An economic sovereignty agenda 
2. A reformed policy toolkit 
3. Effective machinery
4. A flexible implementation strategy 
An economic sovereignty agenda
As a priority, we suggest that when you take office you start by 
working out with your Commission colleagues an economic sov-
ereignty agenda focused on European and national measures that 
will create opportunities and incentives to integrate economic and 
geopolitical considerations at the appropriate levels of govern-
ance. The agenda should have four goals: 
• Boost Europe’s research, scientific, technology and 
innovation base;  
• Protect assets critical to national security from foreign 
interference; 
• Enforce a level playing field in both domestic and interna-
tional competition; 
• Strengthen European monetary and financial autonomy. 
We would suggest that the new Commission president should 
outline this economic sovereignty agenda in his or her first speech 
to the European Parliament, and should publish a more detailed 
proposal by early 2020. 
A reformed policy toolkit
The EU has reasons to be proud of its policy system. It has been 
able to grow into a respected regulatory, trade, competition and 
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monetary giant whose initiatives measure up to those taken by 
other major powers. It has done this while ensuring levels of 
transparency, integrity and effectiveness that meet the best global 
standards. 
But the EU has to adapt its policy toolkit to cope with the new 
reality of greater geopolitical and geo-economic competition. New 
initiatives are necessary in several key fields, some of which con-
cern you directly: 
1. Building on a strong and independent competition policy, 
the EU should define precise procedures to take into 
account economic sovereignty concerns in competition 
decisions. European Commission merger control and the 
abuse of dominant position decisions should continue to 
be based on economic criteria and on independent, legal-
ly-grounded assessments. Importantly, competition policy 
exists to protect consumers not producers. The EU needs 
to avoid politicising competition enforcement or it risks 
capture by powerful producer interests. However, compe-
tition policy decisions should also take into account the 
broader scope of internationalised markets and whether 
incumbents’ market power can be tamed by the threat of 
potential entry. To address cases in which competition 
policy decisions might raise security concerns, you as High 
Representative should be given the right to invoke a security 
clause and object to a decision proposed by the competition 
commissioner. 
2. Because foreign investment gives access to the entire 
internal market, the EU cannot regard investment control 
as a purely national affair. It should develop a common 
approach and common procedures for the screening of 
foreign investments and empower the Commission with the 
right to recommend on security grounds the prohibition of 
certain foreign investments. The Council should be given 
the right to decide by qualified majority to block foreign 
investments based on a Commission recommendation, 
in which you will play a strong part. The current invest-
ment-screening mechanism is a step in the right direction 
* COMPETITION 
POLICY
*  INVESTMENT 
SCREENING
MEMO TO THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY12 | 
but it is insufficient to tackle the common dimension of 
decisions relating to foreign investment. The EU should also 
develop instruments, such as a dedicated investment fund, 
to offer member states alternatives when foreign invest-
ments are disallowed.  
3. The EU should prepare for the possibility of a politically- or 
geopolitically-motivated stalemate over the provision of 
International Monetary Fund assistance to a neighbour-
ing country. It should consider how an external role could 
be given to the European Stability Mechanism or how to 
strengthen EU-budget funded balance-of-payments instru-
ments available to third countries. Such cases will most 
likely have a strong foreign policy dimension, which implies 
that you will play a key role in activating EU assistance.    
4. The EU needs a strategy for development banks. It should 
determine whether it intends to develop the external role 
for the European Investment Bank or rather to leverage its 
investment in the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development to turn it into a truly multilateral development 
institution based in Europe and controlled by European 
shareholders. You should work with your colleagues to 
determine which strategy offers more opportunities. 
5. The EU should also stand ready to respond to unilateral 
sanctions it disagrees with through appropriate and propor-
tionate economic retaliation measures. While it can explore 
ways to overcome secondary sanctions and permit domes-
tic companies to continue to trade with third countries 
recognised by the EU as legitimate partners, the creation 
of special vehicles for such transactions will never lead to 
significant outcomes. Retaliation decisions will involve your 
trade colleague and other commissioners, but you will need 
to be part of them throughout the process.  
6. The EU should preserve and leverage its influence over 
multilateral institutions. But this requires consenting to 
an accelerated rebalancing of quotas and votes, without 
which European countries could end up enjoying oversized 
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power in diminished institutions. Rebalancing should also 
be accompanied by a consolidation of European chairs, 
although that might not in some cases increase European 
influence. You are not a decision-maker in this field, but you 
should definitely have a voice in the process.     
Other initiatives fall outside your remit, but are part of the same 
economic sovereignty agenda and for this reason you should 
monitor them: 
1. State-aid control should not be limited to EU companies. The 
EU should vigilantly monitor distortions to of international 
trade and investment resulting from support provided to 
industry by foreign governments. Direct and indirect subsi-
dies should, if possible, be tackled in the context of the World 
Trade Organisation. If not possible, the EU should consider 
reviewing its competition policy instruments and their possi-
ble application to state aid granted by foreign governments. 
2. As the world evolves towards a multi-currency system, 
economic sovereignty will increasingly require a greater 
international role for the euro. But the euro will not become 
a truly international currency without EU initiatives to sup-
port it in this role. Three conditions are crucial: first, a deep 
and integrated capital and banking market; second (and 
related), the creation of a euro-area safe asset; third, the 
ECB should be able to extend swap lines to partner central 
banks so they can serve as lenders of last resort to local 
banks conducting business in euros. 
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Effective machinery
European governance was not built to implement an encompass-
ing economic sovereignty strategy, but rather to manage sectoral 
policies separately. Reforms are thus needed, as follows:
A European Commission Economic Sovereignty 
Committee: the European Commission has already prioritised 
making the EU a stronger global player. The priority area brings 
together several relevant European commissioners (foreign and 
security policy, neighbourhood and enlargement, trade, inter-
national cooperation and development, civil protection and 
humanitarian aid under your chairmanship). It would introduce 
an economic-security element by including key commissioners 
whose portfolios are not generally thought of as having sovereignty 
implications, including competition policy, economic and finan-
cial affairs, and research, science and innovation. It will be impor-
tant to create strong links with the staff of similar bodies in EU 
member states, to enable coordination of economic sovereignty 
efforts across the levels of governance. 
In addition, a Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
European Union, staffed by some of the economic sovereignty 
staff and containing representatives of relevant directorates-gen-
eral, should be charged with making recommendations on the 
national security implications of large foreign (non-EU) invest-
ments or mergers in the EU. This committee would present its 
recommendations to you and the College of Commissioners. Also, 
an office of Financial Sanctions Enforcement staffed by represen-
tatives of the European External Action Service, the Directorate-
General of Economic and Financial Affairs, and relevant mem-
ber-state representatives, would closely coordinate with banks 
and other financial institutions to ensure that European sanctions 
regulations are strictly enforced. It would also impose penalties on 
entities that violate sanctions.  
A flexible implementation strategy
Implementing these changes cannot be just a Brussels-
based EU-wide effort. Many relevant powers remain with the 
member states and economic sovereignty issues can be divisive 
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within the EU. Perceptions of threats and attitudes towards Russia, 
China and the United States are far from uniform. Therefore the EU 
and its member states will need to coordinate closely with other 
European partners, starting with the post-Brexit United Kingdom, 
which is likely to share many of its neighbour’s priorities and 
concerns. 
While an EU-wide approach is desirable, a more flexible 
approach based on ‘minilateral’ groups of states is likely to be 
necessary. As we have noted, EU countries differ significantly in 
their perceptions of security threats, their vulnerability to exter-
nal pressures and their attitudes towards both the US and China. 
Decisions involving the functioning of the single market or the 
customs union will need to be agreed by the whole EU, but for 
other aspects, a club-type approach, centred on a strong institu-
tional core and similar to that advocated by Demertzis et al (2018), 
is likely to be the best short-term option. The overarching intent is 
to create structures that integrate economic and national security 
considerations at both European and member-state levels.
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